Passkeys are safer than passwords and 2FA codes, but attackers pick the weakest way in. How small companies should set up sign-in and recovery.
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- 4 min read
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- Nick Li
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- #Risk#Strategy
Almost every big service now asks you to "create a passkey". Online, the debate has turned into hot takes: passkeys are a Big Tech lock-in, they will lock older users out of their accounts, SMS codes are good enough, password managers are a honeypot for hackers.
Most of them point to the same real problem, and it isn't the passkey.
Passkeys work
A passkey replaces the password with a key stored on your phone or computer, opened with your face, fingerprint or screen PIN. It is tied to the real website's address, so a fake login page can't use it. An SMS or authenticator code, by contrast, can be talked out of you or relayed from a fake page.
The numbers now back this up. In its Passkey Index 2026 (15 October 2026), the FIDO Alliance reports that 36% of successful sign-ins at the major services it tracks use a passkey, up from 26% a year earlier. Passkey sign-ins succeeded 93% of the time, against 78% for traditional two-factor sign-ins, and took about 27 seconds less. Since May 2025, new Microsoft accounts don't get a password at all by default.
The weak point has moved to the back door
Every account has several ways in: the password, the passkey, an SMS code, an email reset link, recovery codes, a call to support. An attacker doesn't fight your strongest lock. They pick the weakest way in. If you add a passkey but keep "reset by SMS", the account is still only as safe as an SMS.
- "Passkeys will lock people out." The risk is real, but it comes from recovery, not from the passkey. Someone with one phone and no backup will be locked out whether that phone held a passkey or their only authenticator app.
- "SMS 2FA is good enough." For a forum account, it is. On your email or bank, a leftover SMS option becomes the way attackers go after the account.
- "Password managers are a honeypot." In the LastPass breach of 2022, attackers stole backups of encrypted vaults; the UK regulator fined the company £1.2 million in December 2025. The lesson is a strong master password, two-factor on the manager itself and a careful choice of vendor. Going back to reused passwords is far worse.
- "Passkeys lock you into Apple or Google." That was a fair complaint in 2023. Since iOS 26, Apple supports the FIDO Alliance's Credential Exchange for moving passkeys to another password manager, and Android supports it too. Desktop support is still uneven, so if your team mixes Windows PCs and iPhones, a cross-platform manager such as 1Password or Bitwarden avoids most of the friction.
Banks reached the same conclusion. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority asked banks to replace SMS one-time passwords for online card payments with authentication in a bound mobile banking app by the end of 2024, after scammers tricked customers into handing over their SMS codes. Customers without the app can still use SMS.
What we suggest for a small company
Give the accounts that can reset everything else more than one safe way in:
| Account | Sign in with | Backup |
|---|---|---|
| Company email, Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace admin | Passkey or security key | A second passkey or key, printed recovery codes, a second admin |
| Domain, DNS, hosting, website admin | Passkey or authenticator app | Recovery codes kept offline |
| Online banking | The bank's own app | The bank's process; never share a code |
| Facebook and Instagram pages | Passkey or authenticator app | A second admin |
| Low-value sites (newsletters, forums) | Password manager, plus SMS or app codes | Fine as it is |
- Email first. Whoever controls your email can reset almost every other account.
- Two passkeys per important account, for example your phone plus a laptop or a hardware key. Losing one device then isn't a lockout.
- Keep recovery codes on paper, somewhere safe, as well as in your password manager.
- Remove SMS recovery from email and admin accounts once two other ways in work.
- Company accounts on company devices and emails. When someone leaves, remove their passkeys and devices from each account.
- Help the less technical people around you: set up passkeys with them, print their recovery codes, and add a recovery contact where the service offers one.
For staff sign-in, don't switch the whole company overnight. FIDO's State of Passkeys 2026 found that 57% of organisations still rely mainly on passwords for employee sign-in. Start with the admins and the accounts above, then move the rest of the team.
A passkey makes the front door very hard to break. Check the back door too.
If you'd like help checking how your company's key accounts can be accessed and recovered, let's talk.
